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Abstract
Although Japan and the Nordic countries similarly experienced a serious collapse of the
Bubble economy in the early 1990s, the financial recovery of the former is extremely
delayed compared with the latter. In Japan, the Ministry of Finance is often accused of
this, with the claim that it has acted too arbitrarily. The assumption is that it has held, or
had held at least until recently, excessively strong power in the policy-making process,
based on the close connection with banks and politicians.
However, the close connection between relevant actors may also reduce the scope of
their performance. If the policy-making process is conceptualized as the network linking
relevant public/ private actors, the Japanese financial authorities are rather seen as
“trapped” into sticky relations with other actors in the network. As suggested in the
literature of social network and social learning, too close and too closed connections
may deteriorate the learning competence of the actors in the network, partly because
their action tends to be restricted and partly because they tend to get less information
from outside. This theory seems to be strongly supported by the evidence of Japan and
Sweden.
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1. Introduction
While Japan and Sweden similarly experienced the collapse of their Bubble economy at
the beginning of the 1990s, they have presented a striking contrast in their banking
sector policy in the subsequent years. On the one hand, the bank restructuring
management of the Swedish government is widely regarded as one of the "best
practices"
1. Already in 1996, the officers at the Swedish Central Bank came to proclaim
proudly that 'Sweden now has a banking system that is financially robust, dynamic and
competitive'
2. Still in 1999, on the other hand, the Japanese government repeated the
injection of the public fund into many banks so as to enable them to manage bad loans.
It is widely recognized that '[w]hile the initial downturn in activity was smaller in Japan
than in other countries that experienced a correction of asset price overheating in the late
1980s - such as the United Kingdom or Sweden - the weakness in activity has been
considerably more protracted'
3.
There are various factors to explain the difference between Japan and Sweden in their
performance of banking sector policy. One of the most significant factors is the
difference in the magnitude of the pressure from the international financial market.
Sweden was urged to take more radical measures since it is far dependent on the
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international financial market (i.e. large net-borrower). Even though it would be
dangerous to bet on radical measures, it was motivated by the urgent need to regain
credit with the international financial market. By contrast, Japan was a large net-creditor
in the international financial market, and it was not surprising that the lack of strong
incentive inclined the Japanese government to postpone the solution of the problem,
allowing banks to hide a great amount of bad loans, at least until recently.
The regulatory scope of the government authority and the degree of information
disclosure are often mentioned as well. While Sweden achieved considerable
deregulation already in the mid-1980s, the regulatory scope of the financial authority
remained large in Japan. Many of the "neo-classical" critics ascribe the inept handling of
the bad loan problem to the finance ministry's heavy-handed approach to its regulation
of the financial sector
4. As for the information disclosure, the contrast between Japanese
and the Nordic cases is widely perceived. For example, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) pointed out that '[t]he lack of transparency in even recognizing the scale of the
problems in the banking sector has undermined confidence among businesses and the
public at large, with deleterious effects on domestic demand, and stands in marked
contrast to the experience of the Nordic countries, where there was an explicit
recognition by the authorities that transparency was a precondition to the solution of the
banking crisis'
5.
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While recognizing the significance of all the above points, we here focus on the
structure of "policy network" as a factor to complement the above explanations of low
performance of banking sector policy in Japan compared with Nordic countries –
especially Sweden. A policy network is generally defined as a set of links between
actors within a particular policy field, and the underlying assumption is that its structural
characteristics can be treated as explanatory variables for policy outcome
6. One of the
frameworks recently burgeoning from this approach is concerned with the relationship
between policy network and social learning
7. Based on that framework, this study
examines the structure of the "banking crisis policy network" in Japan and Sweden
comparatively, and discusses its effect on those countries’ competence to learn better
solutions.
Since the policy-making process of banking sector policy mainly consists of financial
authorities, banks and politicians at the core, the next section examines the links
between those three actors, mainly illuminating the particularities of the Japanese
system by contrast with the Swedish system as a benchmark. The third section discusses
how those particularities differentiated the performance of banking sector policy in
Japan and Sweden. This is followed by the final section, which draws some implications
from the comparative network analysis and discusses the effectiveness of the ongoing
administrative reform. The most important implication is that the structure of the
Japanese policy network seems to be so cohesive that the financial authorities cannot
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easily take quick and radical steps autonomously. Although the Japanese financial
authorities reputedly hold a large regulatory scope, they in fact enjoy little discretion,
being trapped in the sticky relationship with other actors. From this point of view, the
recent reform discussion seems to focus too narrowly on the reduction in the power of
the financial authorities, without any significant concern about the relational structure
surrounding them. It is questionable, therefore, if this will really increase the
competence of the banking policy management in Japan.
2. Comparing Policy Network between Japan and Sweden
Links between Financial Authorities and Banks
As noted above, it is widely recognized that the Japanese financial authorities held a
large scope of regulation on banks. It is true that the large-scale "Big Bang" deregulation
started in 1998, but this rather indicated how much the regulatory reform in Japan
lagged behind other developed countries. Indeed, the banking-sector deregulation in
Sweden was completed largely in the mid-1980s and it is considered as one of the main
causes of the subsequent "Bubble economy".
Besides formal regulations, moreover, there are numerous informal regulations, so-
called "administrative guidance", in Japan. As a result, 'the banks felt unable to open a
new business or close it without ministry approval - even if no approval was needed
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under the law'
8. The financial authorities' intervention also seems to cover the issues of
corporate governance such as the plan of capital increase and the amount of stock
dividend. According to a report of Asahi Shimbun in 1996, for example, a foreign-
owned bank provided around 3,000 reports for the financial authorities per year, while
the corresponding figures for the British and American financial authorities were 60 and
400 respectively
9. Some attempts have been made to reduce the vagueness of such
informal regulation
10, but they do not appear to be very effective. Against this
background, many banks had long appointed some staff to "MOF-tan" (meaning "in
charge of the Ministry of Finance"), whose mission was to keep a good relationship with
the financial authorities so as to avoid unfavorable regulation, at least until that practice
was publicly criticized in 1998.
The other factor frequently mentioned as a particularity in the Japanese system is the
personal network through retired officers in Japan - so-called the "descent from heaven"
system. It may not necessarily be blameful for the financial authorities to be employed
after retirement in the financial sector to utilize their specialized financial knowledge. In
Sweden, such personal transfer is not seen as problematic, although  the number of the
cases is not basically so high. What is idiosyncratic of Japan is that jobs are offered by
the ministry as a part of its personnel system. Many banks have some particular
positions where retired officers come and go successively. Those positions often include
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representative positions, whereby the financial authority exert a decisive influence over
their corporate governance.
It is true that the National Civil Service Law prohibits retired officers from working
for the companies when they had a close relationship before retirement. Yet that
prohibition becomes invalid either when they obtain permission from the National
Personnel Agency (NPA) or when the period after retirement exceeds two years. The
latter condition is particularly important, for retired officers are usually transferred to
relevant public agencies (including the central bank) for some years, and then get their
position in banks without any inspection by the NPA.
Links between Financial Authorities and Politicians
In his comparative analysis of public administration, Pierre categorized several
developed countries by the degree of integration in the bureaucratic system and by the
degree of personal exchange between government authorities and politicians, as in
Figure 1. Although it is a rough sketch as he admitted, it describes a clear contrast
between Japan and Sweden. Based on his and his colleagues' study, he contrasted
Japanese and Swedish government authorities, the former being most concerted and
politicized and the latter being most fragmented and distant from politicians.
Figure  1 Organizational structures and different types of political and
administrative career patterns8
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There are a number of institutional particularities of the Japanese system, which seem
to contribute to the politicization of government authorities. Although abandoned in
1999, the "government delegate" system was one of the most significant institutions.
Under this system, government authorities were entitled to deliver a speech against the
opposition politicians in the Diet discussion, in place of politicians. Since political
issues regarding the financial system often require special knowledge, politicians tended
to rely on the government agencies for their answers to the Diet questions. It is often
said that this had substantially atrophied the decision-making capacity of politicians,
while increasing the self-confidence of government authorities.
When considering the bureaucrats-politicians relationship, we also need to take
account of the special grouping system among Japanese politicians - so-called "zoku"
("tribe" in English). While it has no formal institution, nor is there any approved
definition, many politicians, particularly those of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP -
the ruling party in Japan for most of the postwar period), identify themselves as a
member of one or more "zoku" groups. "Zoku" groups are usually organized along9
policy areas such as agriculture, construction and finance. Each "zoku" has a close
connection with a particular ministry, and the counterpart of the financial authorities is
"Okura-zoku" ("financial policy tribe"). Since "zoku" politicians are normally
sympathetic with their bureaucratic counterparts, they often lobby other politicians
representing the interests of the financial authorities. The existence of close personal
relationship is confirmed by the fact that many of the Okura-zoku politicians have some
experience of working for the Ministry of Finance
12.
Links between Banks and Politicians
No matter what is their party affiliation, politicians generally tend to try to keep a good
relationship with banks both in Japan and Sweden, because banks often play a key role
in national economy, and economic climate is one of the key factors for the popularity
of politicians. This may more likely be applicable to such countries as Japan and
Sweden, where banks-borrowers relationship is supposed to be strong under the
framework which is so-called "main-bank system"
13.
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Yet we should note that Japanese banks are potentially more influential over
politicians than Swedish banks, because they are important donors for political funding
of the LDP. Formerly, most of the donations were transferred through Japan Federation
of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) on the ground that collective donation was
desirable to avoid collusion between politicians and individual companies/ business
sectors. Nevertheless, in 1993, Keidanren stopped playing an intermediary role as the
result of strong criticism against its relationship with the LDP. Consequently, the LDP
come to be financed either by individual banks or by Japanese Bankers Association
(Zenginkyo).
In Sweden, by contrast, the public contribution (i.e. from tax) accounts for a large
share of the party income
14. It is true that the Moderate Party, which often plays a
leading role in the non-socialist coalition government, receive donation from particular
companies, but the public contribution is still the most important part. Moreover,
business donation is not the case for other right-wing coalition parties.
We should also remember that Japanese elections are far more costly than Swedish
ones. This is not only because Japanese voters are often concerned about direct benefits
(not so straightforward as "money", but such other forms as banquets), but also because
Japanese elections are not really party-based. Despite several reforms of the electoral
system, the personality of individual candidates seems to remain more significant than
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Eni Enrico Mattei)
14 See Bäck, M. and Möller, T. (1995) Partier och organisationer (3rd ed.) (Stockholm: Fritze), p.15511
their party affiliation in Japan. It would naturally be costly for individual candidates to
attract voters when their party affiliation does not help so much as in Sweden.
3. Explaining Policy Output by the Policy Network Structure
Traditional "Strong MOF" Model
The above particularities in the Japanese policy network are often followed by the
argument of the "strong MOF" model. That is, the Japanese financial authorities not
only benefit from heavy formal regulations but also enjoy establishing numerous
informal rules to control even such issues as corporate governance. The control of the
financial authorities is expected to be reinforced under the supervision of the executives
transferred through the "descent from heaven" system.
The power of the Japanese financial authorities vis-à-vis politicians is often estimated
to be large, as well. Given their informational advantage, politicized government
authorities tend to take the lead in the policy-making process in place of politicians.
Under the zoku system, furthermore, some particular politicians (i.e. Okura-zoku) are
more sympathetic to the financial authorities than others, easier to understand their
view, and more willing to help persuade other politicians. Since many politicians in
other zoku identify their interest with those of other particular ministries, they also
depend on the financial authorities' power of controlling budget distribution to those
ministries. This results in the rise of the status of Okura-zoku among politicians, hence
enhancing the power of the financial authorities. The financial dependence of politicians
on banks also has a positive implication of the strength of the financial authorities. As12
banks have a close relationship with the financial authorities, the former may lobby
politicians for the sake of the latter, as long as their interest is not inconsistent.
In consequence, few appear to pose a question to such a view that '[i]t appears no one
- politicians, banks, other officials - was prepared to challenge its judgements'
15. In the
discussion on the banking sector policy in Japan, some commentators accuse the
financial authorities of their failure of the banking sector policy, sometimes giving such
a severe criticism that 'the ministry had stripped Japan of its economic immortality'
16.
On the other hand, some commentators observe that 'the collapse of the Bubble
economy was not the unexpected failure of the MOF, but rather the deliberate scenario
planned by it'
17. In either case, most arguments start with the assumption that the
Japanese financial authorities played a dominant role in the whole policy-making
process, at least until they began to be exposed to severe criticism due to some bribery
scandals and underwent several institutional reforms, notably the establishment of the
Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) in 1998.
Question to the Traditional Model - Comparison between Japan and Sweden
Despite a wide consensus of the traditional "Strong MOF" model, the comparison
between the Japanese and Swedish financial authorities gives a somewhat different
picture to us. If the particularities of the Japanese policy networks make the Japanese
financial authorities strong, the lack of those elements in the Swedish policy network
may well make the Swedish financial authorities relatively weak. In reality, however,
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the Japanese financial authorities look less autonomous than their Swedish counterparts
in the banking sector policy.
In Sweden, the financial authorities won strong political support for their proposal of
the establishment of a special asset management agency (Securum) and of the large-
scale public fund injection into the most-damaged bank (Nordbanken) in 1992. It is true
that the sense of crisis was widely shared and hence it was easy to gain a consensus on
such radical measures, but we should remember that no one was entirely sure of the
effectiveness of those measures. There was certainly a strong popular feeling against the
public expenditure for saving "bad banks". Some less-damaged banks were also worried
about market distortion by such special treatment. In particular, Handelsbanken, which
was most cautions in lending activity during the Bubble economy and hence the least
damaged by its collapse, persistently sought to limit the scope of state intervention
18.
Under those circumstances, it may rather be surprising that the proposal of the financial
authorities was largely backed up not only by the government parties but also by most of
the opposition parties (except the New Democrats - the radical right/ populist party) in
the end.
By contrast, the Japanese financial authorities seem to have been very weak in
carrying out their proposal about bad loan management. Although it is not frequently
mentioned in the relevant literature, the Japanese financial authorities had proposed the
establishment of an asset management agency, like Securum in Sweden, already in
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1992. Nevertheless, they finally had to withdraw that proposal, partly because it was
rejected by the LDP and partly because the financial authorities could not persuade
politicians for lack of real financial information of banks. As for the first point, we
should remember that the then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa suggested public
support for bad loan problem in 1992, but it was followed by strong popular concern
about spending public fund for the sake of bad banks. He also encountered the
opposition of bank managers, for they wanted to avoid making their failure uncovered as
he speculated in retrospect
19. With regard to information disclosure of banks, moreover,
we should note that there was no formal legislation of requiring banks to disclose their
information at that time. Whereas the original proposal of the 1981 Bank Law (written
by the financial authorities) included the provision for information disclosure, it was
abandoned under the pressure of banks
20. It is therefore unclear whether the Japanese
financial authorities hid relevant information by intention, even though some scholars
asserted that 'it seems quite prudent with hindsight that the authorities waited until rather
late in the game to become transparent' because 'greater transparency will actually
reduce speculation about the overall integrity of the system'
21.
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The problem of the housing-loan companies (so-called jusen) in 1996 highlighted the
weakness of the financial authorities. While the public fund injection into those
companies was often regarded as a sign of the power of the financial authorities, we
should note that it would have been unnecessary if the financial authorities had
persuaded banks and politicians to take the burdens which they calculated. As they had
already incurred strong public antagonism due to some scandals in the previous year,
they could naturally speculate that their expenditure of public funds would worsen the
situation. Even if they thought that the public fund injection was inevitable, they would
manipulate the timing, if they could. After all, they seemed to do it at the worst time.
Consequently, we had better see it as the weakness, rather than the strength, of the
financial authorities in Japan. By comparison, the Swedish financial authorities do not
appear to have incurred any substantial damage in their reputation of policy
management.
Alternative Explanations for the Japanese Model
If the above observation is right, we then need to consider why the Japanese financial
authorities look rather weaker than their Swedish counterparts. For this purpose, let us
reconsider the meaning of the factors specific to Japan, which we examined in the last
section.
With regard to the relationship between banks and the financial authorities, we
observed that their relationship often stands on informal rules and the "descent from
heaven" system. While those factors are usually treated as facilitating the power of the
financial authorities, the opposite is more likely to be the case in recent years. Against16
the background of deregulation, the connection with the authorities appears to be less
attractive to banks. On top of that, the economic slump has made banks more cautious
about the cost of the recruitment of the retired officers. In relation to this, we should
note that over 80% of 300 middle-ranking businessmen in the largest companies in
Japan answered that businesses should be more distant from the government, whilst
only 7% of them considered the "descent from heaven" as ‘necessary’ or ‘rather
necessary’, according to the survey of Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha in 1994
22.
On the other hand, we should note that 76% of high-level government authorities still
believed at the time of 1993 that their “descent from heaven” was necessary, either
because it was useful in obtaining the policy needs of the private sector (43%), because
‘their salary was low’ (which implies that it should be compensated by the good salary
which private companies expected to offer them
23) (22%), or because they believed that
‘businesses demanded it’ (11%). In either case, there is a large demand for “descent
from heaven” on the side of the financial authorities. Since the current employment
routine forces the majority of high-ranking officers to retire very early when they are
filtered out from the promotion race, the ministries are expected to take care of them.
Given those conditions, the “descent from heaven” system seems to have strengthened
the bargaining power of banks vis-à-vis the financial authorities in recent years.
Against this background, the dependence on informal rules may well have reduced
the scope of the regulatory power of the financial authorities. After all, banks are able to
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Great Power) (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha), pp.427-43517
reject the intervention of the financial authorities unless it is formal. They may threaten
to stop their co-operation for the "descent from heaven" system, if necessary.
Even if banks cannot impose enough pressure in this way, they may also mobilize the
support of politicians. It is clear that politicians become more dependent on the financial
support of banks, given that the economic slump makes it difficult to find other financial
sources. In that case, the close political - bureaucratic relationship may well contribute
to the reduction in the regulatory scope of the financial authorities. While the Okura-
zoku politicians are basically sympathetic to the financial authorities, they do not need
to do that especially when they recognize that banks do not support the stance of the
financial authorities. Once zoku politicians intend to take the initiative, the financial
authorities become powerless. Since zoku politicians are knowledgeable about financial
policies, they are less likely be persuaded by the argument of the financial authorities.
Furthermore, they often have various personal connections which facilitate their control
over the financial authorities. While the financial authorities generally gain credit with
their "seniors" in the Okura-zoku group, they may seldom come into conflict against
seniority. On this point, we should remember that Miyazawa, who persuaded the
financial authorities to withdraw their bad-loan agency plan when he was the Prime
Minister, was one of the "giants" of the Okura-zoku with much experience as a financial
officer. It is quite understandable that the financial authorities became quiet once he
decided not to put that plan forward.
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What is more, the political change in the early 1990s has had a negative effect on the
autonomy of the financial authorities. It is true that the financial authorities once
enjoyed greater autonomy under the non-LDP government in 1993-4, for the
government politicians were not so skilled as the LDP politicians who had dominated
the government position for almost forty years. In fact, the financial authorities took this
opportunity and tried to push through a radical tax reform, which was not acceptable
under the LDP government. This broke a trustful relationship between the financial
authorities and the LDP politicians, and the LDP politicians has become less
sympathetic and more skeptical about the advice of the financial authorities after they
returned to the government. Also, their harsh treatments on some rebellious officers
24
seems to make others reluctant to give ambitious advice.
In light of those points, it seems a bit too simplistic to interpret the absence of any
significant reaction to the bad loan problem entirely as the prudence or inertia of the
financial authorities in the case of Japan. It is true that the economic conditions required
the financial authorities to take quicker and more proactive approaches in the case of
Sweden, and it may also be true that the Swedish officers were more competent and
courageous than the Japanese officers. Nonetheless, we should note that the policy
performance of the Japanese financial authorities is in fact much more restricted than
what it is generally thought to be.
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4. Conclusion: implication from the comparative policy network analysis
This study examines the performance of the Japanese financial authorities, particularly
focusing on a number of elements which make the Japanese policy network distinct
from those in other countries. Whereas the Swedish policy network has its own
particularities compared with other Nordic countries, the Japanese - Swedish network
comparison gives a new hint to understand why Japan is so slow in recovering from the
collapse of Bubble in comparison with Nordic countries. That is to say, the Japanese
policy network is composed of too close and too closed connections between relevant
actors. Under that condition, the actors tend to perform less autonomously with the
concern about the others' interests. The evidence also corresponds to one of the
traditional arguments in the social network literature that the closed network structure
may not be good at learning new ideas (in this case, policy models) for lack of
communication (and lack of interest to communicate) with outside parties
25.
In the literature of Japanese political economy, much discussion has been made to
specify who is strong in the policy-making process, but more important is to understand
why it matters. As this study shows, the same elements may function either positively or
negatively for the strength of the financial authorities. What looks unchanged is that the
closed network structure seems to amplify the strength and weakness of actors
embedded in the network. It may be right to say that the Japanese financial authorities
had previously been overwhelming in the policy-making process taking advantage of the
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closed network structure, but now they appear to reduce their policy performance
considerably suffering from the sticky relations with other actors.
From this point of view, it is questionable whether the recent administrative reform
goes in the right direction. Based on the traditional "strong MOF" model, much effort
has been made to reduce the power of the financial authorities. While too much
confidence with bureaucrats reduces social welfare, too much allergy may also lead to
the same result. Given that the financial authorities have in fact followed the interests of
banks and politicians in many occasions, the transition of authority to banks and
politicians may not produce much significant effect. As suggested by Tomita, too much
bureaucrats bashing under the name of "politics-leading" and "market-leading" may well
end up with the serious distortion of the policy-making process
26. On top of that, we
should remember that the recent reform has not caused any significant change in the
structural particularities of the Japanese policy network. When we discuss the future
policy performance in Japan, therefore, we still need to take this into consideration.
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